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judgments), and those rules govern other governmental decisions. The default-logic paradigm models the role of such rules in legal reasoning. This Part of the article introduces "implication trees" -the default-logic structure used to capture legal rules. Part II will add logical structures for modeling the application of such rules to particular cases.
A. Implication Trees as Models of Legal Rules
In the default-logic model, a legal rule is a universally applicable, conditional proposition. It is a conditional proposition of the form "if p, then q," where p and q stand for two constituent propositions. A legal rule states that finding proposition p (the condition) to be true warrants finding q (the conclusion) to be true also. A proposition is the meaning or informational content of an assertion, usually expressed in ordinary language by a sentence or clause. 13 Moreover, a legal rule is universal in application -it warrants making the inference in all situations described by the condition in the "if" clause. If there are any exceptions to the rule, other rules should identify those exceptions and govern the reasoning in those exceptional cases. A legal rule, therefore, identifies an acceptable line of legal reasoning to a conclusion in all similar cases, where the relevant similarity is specified by the rule's condition.
The default-logic model reflects the dynamic nature of legal reasoning by assigning to the propositions of legal rules one of three truth-values: true, false, or undecided.
14 When legal reasoning begins in a particular situation, the truth-values of the conditions and conclusions of the 13 Distinctions should be made between sentences and propositions, and between linguistics and logic. A sentence is a linguistic unit consisting of words, phrases, clauses and other grammatical elements, while a proposition is the logical content of a statement or assertion, which is capable of being true or false. IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 5-6 (10 th ed. 1998); MARK SAINSBURY, LOGIC FORMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 25-28 (1991) . Different sentences, either in the same language or in different languages, can express the same proposition. COPI & COHEN, supra, at 5-6. Linguistics studies the grammatical structure of ordinary languages, while logic studies the reasoning structure expressed in those languages. See, e.g., LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, at 1, 9-11, 22-24, 67-76 (distinguishing semantic and syntactic theory from logical theory).
14 A system of legal rules based on more than three truth-values would be very complicated and largely unprincipled. It would be complicated because it would require rules for the different truth-values of an antecedent condition. For example, the legal implication of a condition that is very likely to be true could be different than the implication if the condition is only probably true. But if there is a difference between two such rules, then there should be policy reasons for treating the two cases differently, and it might be very difficult to give such reasons to cover all permutations in a many-valued systems. As discussed infra in Part II, a three-valued system in the rule-based portion of reasoning allows a basis for harmonizing factfinder evaluation of the evidence, without imposing on the factfinder any particular truth-value system to use in evaluating that evidence. applicable legal rules are undecided. The evidence and reasoning may change the truth-values of conditions (or "factual triggers") for rules, which may in turn change the truth-values of conclusions. Traditional two-valued logic paid insufficient attention to the dynamics of truth-value change, and constructed static models for only the end results of reasoning. The default-logic paradigm, by contrast, incorporates dynamic reasoning into the logical structure, and can therefore provide an understanding of the flow of rule-based reasoning.
The condition of a legal rule normally has a complex logical structure. It is usually a set of propositions that are connected by one or more of three logical operators: AND, OR, and UNLESS. Rules with conditions connected by "AND" are called conjunctive rules, and each constituent proposition of the condition is called a conjunct. 15 An example of a conjunctive rule is the tort rule identifying the factual elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case for battery:
16
If the defendant performed a voluntary act, AND the defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with a person, AND the defendant's act caused a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff, then the defendant is subject to liability to the plaintiff for battery.
A conjunctive rule requires the proof of all of its conjuncts before it warrants drawing the conclusion. 17 Rules may also be disjunctive, with the constituent propositions of the condition 15 Logical conjunction models part of the meaning of many ordinary-language words and phrases, including "and," "also," "moreover," "but," "yet," "nevertheless," and "although." For discussions of using conjunction to model the propositions expressed by English sentences, see, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 345-47; ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: SYMBOLIC LOGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 17-27 (1997); SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 62-65. 16 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND § § 2, 13, 18; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 47-63 (2000) . 17 The following table defines the truth-function for three-valued conjunction in an implication tree. In the table, the three truth-values are: F = false, U = undecided, and T = true. The top row and left column list the possible truth-values of the two conjuncts, while the cells in the table specify the resulting truthvalue of the conclusion. 18 With a disjunctive rule, proving any one or more of the disjuncts is sufficient for proving the conclusion. 19 For example, the tort causes of action in battery and in negligence are two alternative ways to prove that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for compensatory damages. The third type of default-logic connective is "defeater," denoted by "UNLESS." 20 With a defeater rule, if the condition (defeater proposition) is true, then the rule warrants the conclusion to be false. 21 An example of a defeater is an affirmative defense to a
See the definition of the many-valued connective "et 1 ", GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 66. 18 Logical disjunction models part of the meaning of the ordinary-language words "or" and "either … or … ." For discussions of using disjunction to model the propositions expressed by English sentences, see, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 348-50; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 59-73; SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 65-68. 19 The following table defines the truth-function for three-valued disjunction in an implication tree. In the table, the three truth-values are: F = false, U = undecided, and T = true. The top row and left column list the possible truth-values of the two disjuncts, while the cells in the table specify the resulting truthvalue of the conclusion.
See the definition of the many-valued connective "vel 1 ", GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 90.
20 Logical defeater can model part of the meaning of such words and phrases as "unless," "provided that," and "except when." For logical discussions of the defeater connective, see BREWKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 2-3, 16; POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 79. Also see infra note 64. 21 Unless a defeater proposition is true, the truth-value of the conclusion remains what it would have been in the absence of a defeater proposition. cause of action. A prima facie case for battery can be defeated by the privilege to use reasonable force under certain conditions, such as when the defendant is making a lawful arrest or defending herself from intentionally inflicted bodily harm. 22 Conjunctive, disjunctive, and defeater connectives are truth-functional in operation -that is, the truth-value of the conclusion is entirely a function of the truth-values of the constituent propositions in the condition. The truth-function for each connective determines the truth-value of the conclusion based on the truth-values of the constituent propositions in the condition. 23 Their truth-functional nature makes it straightforward to capture their operation completely within artificial intelligence software.
24
The default-logic paradigm constructs "implication trees" to model complex legal rules and chains of such rules.
25 Implication trees start with the ultimate conclusion at the top and branch downward, making an inverted tree. For example, the following implication tree models the plaintiff's prima facie case for battery: 22 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND § § 63-76, 112-39; DOBBS, supra note 16, at 159-70, 190-204. 23 On the concept of truth-functional connectives generally, see, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 345-46; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 96-104; SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 49-51. 24 See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 6, at 206-10, 524. 25 A number of legal theorists have analyzed portions of legal reasoning as having a tree-like structure. See, e.g., ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at 108-55 (concluding that "Wigmorean charts are a species of what today are sometimes described as 'directed acyclic graphs'"); JOSEPH B. KADANE & DAVID A. SCHUM, A PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SACCO AND VANZETTI EVIDENCE 66-74 (1996) (developing inference networks as directed acyclic graphs with the root node -the ultimate issue to be proved -at the top, and the chains of reasoning extending from the evidence at the bottom upward to the root node); DAVID A. SCHUM, EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING 156-94 (1994) (interpreting Wigmorean evidence charts as "directed acyclic graphs whose nodes indicate propositions and whose arcs represent fuzzy probabilistic linkages among these nodes"); WALTON, supra note 1, at 338-48 (discussing argument diagramming). For a discussion of the tree-like inference structure developed by Schum and Kadane, see Vern R. Walker Such a logic diagram shows that, according to this rule, the upper-level proposition is warranted to be true if all three lower-level propositions are true. An implication tree models a legal rule as two adjacent levels, with the upper level stating the conclusion of the rule, a logical connective between the two levels specifying the truth-function involved, and the lower level identifying the constituent propositions of the condition. Each proposition in the lower level might then become the conclusion of another rule, whose condition would add yet a lower level to the implication tree.
This logical structure constitutes an inverted "tree" because the branches from upper-level propositions to lower-level propositions never loop back to a higher level, but continue to expand downward. 26 In principle, the substantive legal rules of tort law that can warrant compensatory damages can be modeled as one large implication tree. For example, the implication tree for battery might begin as follows: 26 See KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 25, at 71 (constructing evidence charts that are directed acyclic graphs and "resemble trees whose branches seem to converge to a single trunk or root"); SCHUM, supra note 25, at 169-73 (discussing directed acyclic graphs). According to these rules, if the plaintiff proves all three of the conjuncts at the bottom, then the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for battery, unless the defendant proves that she was privileged to perform the action she did. The defendant can establish a privilege by proving either that she acted reasonably in making a lawful arrest or that she acted reasonably in defending herself from harmful contact. This logic diagram also displays how the defeater connective operates. Defeater functions as a kind of switch that can, under the specified condition, override the inference that would otherwise occur.
The goal in constructing an implication tree is to model all of the legally acceptable lines of reasoning that can prove or disprove the ultimate issue stated by the conclusion at the top of the tree. The three logical connectives model all the ways that lower-level propositions can combine to prove or disprove upper-level propositions. At the bottom level of each branch of a tree, where the legal rules end, the constituent propositions in the conditions of those last rules are the "terminal" propositions of the tree. The truth-value for a terminal proposition cannot be determined by lower rules in the tree, for by definition there are no further legal rules. Taken together, the set of all the terminal propositions for a tree is the set of all possible findings that are relevant for proving or disproving the ultimate issue at the top. The terminal propositions are the issues of fact to be determined by the factfinder. Part II of this article examines the reasoning of the factfinder in making such findings. The implication-tree structure, however, shows the role of legal rules in 
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Implication trees display graphically many default-logic features of legal rules. First, implication trees make every step of the reasoning transparent, by showing the conditions that are relevant to warranting the conclusion and the logical connectives within that inference. Second, implication trees that model all of the acceptable lines of reasoning that can warrant a particular conclusion can be said to capture the legal meaning or significance of the conclusion. A complete implication tree for battery shows what the law of torts means by "battery." Third, implication trees suggest possible strategies for proving or warranting intermediate and ultimate conclusions. A graphical representation can present a large amount of information at one time. It can show how all possible reasoning "fits together," while retaining detailed information within the branches of the tree.
Implication trees also display the dynamics of the reasoning. The implication tree for battery, for example, suggests the dynamic structure of a prima facie case, a rebuttal, and an exception or affirmative defense. The main conjunctive branch of the tree shows what the plaintiff must prove in order to establish a prima facie case. The defendant, in response, has three options for defending against the plaintiff's claim. First, the defendant can rebut the truth of one or more of the constituent propositions of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Second, the defendant can assert an affirmative defense and prove the truth of one or more defeater propositions. Third, the defendant can argue for a change in the legal rules -that is, argue for a change in the shape of the implication tree itself.
In addition to implication trees, the default-logic paradigm uses concept-based entailments to model supplemental legal rules. Traditional predicate logic analyzes propositions into a logical predicate and one or more logical subjects, and those logical components can form the factual conditions for legal rules. 28 A logical predicate is the element of a proposition that indicates what is 27 An important corollary is that adopting a new legal rule not only expands the implication tree downward, but almost always expands it horizontally as well, increasing the number of terminal propositions. Adopting new legal rules almost always adds new issues of fact and increases the complexity of the legal cases brought using the implication tree. 28 For general discussions of predicate logic, see, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 428-65; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 113-206; SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 133-219.
For applications of predicate logic to semantic theories about the meaning of sentences, see, e.g., LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, at 115-226, 319-59 (discussing the meaning of verbs and predication, proper nouns, pronouns, demonstratives, and definite descriptions); CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 53-193 (developing a referential or denotational approach to meaning, based on predicate logic); SAEED, supra note 5, at 292-341 (discussing a formal or logical semantics based on predicate logic).
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CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE being affirmed or denied about one or more subjects. For example, the proposition "the plaintiff has developed cancer" classifies the plaintiff (the logical subject) as a member of the class of persons who have developed cancer ("… has developed cancer" being the logical predicate). A logical subject is an element of a proposition that names, denotes, or refers to one or more objects or events that the proposition is about. 29 Analyzed from a predicate-logic perspective, therefore, a proposition asserts something (expressed by the predicate) about one or more objects or events (named by the subject or subjects).
Logical predicates and subjects employ concepts (expressed by nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and other grammatical types) that can be linked by legal rules. Some rules identify class/sub-class relationships among concepts, such that any attribute of members of the class is necessarily an inherited attribute of members of the sub-class. For example, if a specific individual Jones is a defendant, then the class/sub-class relationship "party/defendant," warrants that Jones is also a party, and has all the attributes that attach to being a party (e.g., having a right to be notified about proceedings that determine his rights and obligations). 30 Other legal rules combine multiple concepts into a set of jointly sufficient conditions for applying a predicate to a subject. For example, being both a "party" to a lawsuit and a "corporation" means that citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction in federal court is determined by the corporation's state of incorporation and its principal place of business. 31 A definition of a word or concept combines both types of relationship (necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) into a single statement of equivalence.
32
29 In English, the grammatical subject of a sentence usually identifies a subject of the proposition expressed by the sentence. Grammatical and logical form, however, are not necessarily identical. An English sentence may have a single grammatical subject, but the proposition that it expresses might have multiple logical subjects. For example, the sentence "Jones leases the property from Smith" has a single grammatical subject (Jones), but asserts a relationship among three logical subjects (Jones, the particular property, and Smith). 30 See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD These kinds of rules are still conditional in logical form, but they identify entailments among concepts, not implications among unanalyzed propositions. Such rules tend to exhibit the logical property of "locality" -that is, the truth-value of the conclusion is determined by the truth-values of a specifiable set of conditions.
33 Concept-based entailments can play a useful role in warranting inferences between propositions in different branches of the same implication tree, or between propositions within different implication trees. They only supplement the strategic work of an implication tree, however, which is designed to capture all of the legal rules that are oriented toward proving a particular ultimate conclusion.
Using implication trees and concept-based entailments to model legal rules can help achieve the epistemic objective. 34 Such models can make transparent the exact rules that are in play, and identify with precision the triggering conditions for those rules. Such transparent precision allows criticism and refinement of those rules, as well as consistency of application, predictability of outcome for potentially affected parties, and reviewability by other legal institutions. These formal models can also suggest optimal proof strategies for those parties producing evidence. In addition, as Part II of this article will discuss, the models can help factfinders to identify relevant evidence, organize it, and evaluate its probative value. Part II demonstrates how legal rules turn the available evidence into warrant for drawing the ultimate conclusions. By providing a standardized method of modeling rules, the default-logic paradigm enables more effective comparisons between different legal rule-structures, and may suggest more efficient designs. Finally, as the default-logic paradigm successfully models the structure of legal reasoning and factfinding, it allows the automation of those models -and therefore the automation of important parts of legal reasoning.
For examples of semantic theories using a rule-based approach to specifying truth-conditions for the meaningful use of ordinary words, see, e.g., LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, at 25-42 (adopting the approach of studying knowledge of word meaning by developing deductive theories about truth conditions for ordinary sentences); CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 73-81 (setting the goal of providing "a fully explicit, that is, fully formalized, specification of truth conditions for sentences" having propositional structures); SAEED, supra note 5, at 292-341 (exploring a formal semantics in which "the listener who understands the sentence is able to determine the truth conditions of the uttered sentence, that is, know what conditions in the world would make the sentence true"). 33 See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 6, at 230, 524 (discussing locality as a desirable property of logical rule-based systems). 34 This article does not discuss how to craft the appropriate default-logic model for capturing a particular piece of legal reasoning. The art of logical modeling tries to elucidate the warrant and formalize the legal reasoning that appears in particular statutes, regulations, administrative adjudications, and judicial decisions. Policy-Based Reasoning about Implication Trees
Legal rules provide the deductive structure for legal reasoning, but they are also the subject matter of legal reasoning about their justification. The justification for adopting or not adopting particular legal rules generally takes the form of policy-based reasoning. In the default-logic framework, policies are not constituent elements within implication trees, but rather guide the decisional process of constructing implication trees. 35 Moreover, legal policies are often diverse and competing: epistemic policies are primarily designed to achieve the epistemic objective (producing accurate findings warranted by the legally available evidence), while non-epistemic policies primarily pursue such objectives as procedural fairness and administrative efficiency. 36 Therefore, the modeling of policy-based reasoning within the default-logic paradigm poses two major problems. The first is how to model the content of the reasoning that connects a particular policy objective to any particular rule. The second problem is how to balance many lines of such reasoning, oriented toward diverse policy objectives, into a single justification for a particular rule.
This article does not present a formal model for policy-based reasoning. A promising approach, however, is one analogous to the model for evaluating evidence to arrive at a warranted finding of fact -a model that Part II addresses in detail. Just as there are default-logic structures for organizing and weighing relevant evidence, there may be analogous structures for organizing and balancing policy rationales. 37 Moreover, the success of the default-logic paradigm in modeling legal process rules (the topic of Part III of this article) gives additional reason to think that the paradigm can also clarify policy-based reasoning. The formal adoption of a legal rule is itself a kind of governmental action that requires justification, and there are several areas where reasoning about rule justification can be studied. Administrative rulemaking is an example of rule adoption, and its 35 Policy-based reasoning is therefore "second-order reasoning." It is reasoning about whether to adopt the legal rules that, if adopted, can be modeled within implication trees. 36 Vern R. Walker, Epistemic and Non-epistemic Aspects of the Factfinding Process in Law, APA NEWSLETTER 03, no. 1, 132, 132 (Fall 2003) (arguing that "any factfinding process in a governmental institution is designed to balance the epistemic objective against relevant non-epistemic objectives"). The importance or priority placed on achieving the epistemic objective, in competition with various nonepistemic objectives, might vary from one area of law to another, and from one policy objective to another. It would be difficult, however, to imagine an area of law in which the epistemic objective had no importance whatsoever. 37 For example, if there are definitions and measures of efficiency, then a policy argument about whether a particular rule will or will not increase efficiency can become an empirical question. Research on such examples of policy-based reasoning, using the tools developed within the defaultlogic paradigm, should be able to clarify formally the interplay among rule application, rule adoption, and evidence evaluation.
Policies are particularly important in analyzing principled changes in legal rules or implication trees. The goal of a "synchronic" logic model is to capture all of the rule-based deductions that are acceptable at a single point in time. A complete implication tree should capture all of the applicable legal rules that are relevant to proving the ultimate conclusion of the tree at that point in time. It is also possible, however, to model how legal rules and implication trees change over time. This furnishes a "diachronic" model of legal reasoning. Legislatures and regulatory agencies might adopt new rules, or amend or rescind old ones. Courts might adopt new interpretations of statutory provisions, or adopt new common-law rules or overrule prior cases. Policies not only justify new rule adoption, but they also help explain the course of past rule change. The default-logic paradigm provides synchronic models of rule systems at different times, and therefore allows a precise picture of how implication trees change over time. Although diachronic models of legal rule systems can become quite complex, they allow research into the policy-driven aspect of that change. As Part II explores the default logic of evidence evaluation, it also suggests methods for evaluating the policy-based arguments behind rule change.
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II. EVIDENCE EVALUATION AND PLAUSIBILITY SCHEMAS
The default-logic paradigm addresses a major flaw of the traditional approach to legal reasoning by modeling rule-based deductions and evidence evaluation as parts of a single continuum. Within the paradigm, factfinding is the process of "attaching" relevant evidence to a terminal proposition of a legal implication tree, evaluating the probative value of that evidence, and using that evaluation to assign a truth-value to the terminal proposition. Legal reasoning therefore has two major components: rule-based deduction within the implication tree, and the evaluation of evidence attached to the implication tree. 41 Part I of this article examined rule-based, three-valued deductions, modeled by implication trees and concept-based entailments among subjects and predicates. Part II extends the default-logic model to evidence evaluation by formalizing patterns of reasoning in which propositions are plausible, and therefore presumptive, but defeasible. 42 Part III will examine process rules in law, using the logic models developed in Parts I and II. 41 The traditional taxonomic divisions of logic (deduction, induction, and abduction) are not particularly useful in the default-logic paradigm. While deduction occurs within the rule-based portion of an implication tree, the tree itself is embedded in a broader reasoning context that includes both inductive and abductive aspects. See WALTON, supra note 7, at 42-3 (stating that in his treatment "presumptive reasoning is neither deductive nor inductive in nature, but represents a third distinct type of reasoning of the kind classified by Rescher (1976) as plausible reasoning, an inherently tentative kind of reasoning subject to defeat by the special circumstances (not defined inductively or statistically) of a particular case") (citing N. RESCHER, PLAUSIBLE REASONING (1976)).
Wigmore apparently regarded induction as an inference from an evidentiary assertion about a particular individual to a conclusion about that same individual, while he regarded deduction as supporting the same conclusion syllogistically, using an "implied law or generalization" as a major premise. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § § 9-10 (1937), reprinted in ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at 63-66 (asserting that the form of inference in court is usually inductive, but that "every inductive inference is at least capable of being transmuted into and stated in the deductive form, by forcing into prominence the implied law or generalization on which it rests"). The Plausibility of Evidence as Warrant
In general, the task of the factfinder is to determine the truth-values of the terminal propositions of an implication tree by evaluating the relevant portion of the available evidence. 43 The terminal propositions of an implication tree are the lowest propositions in every branch of the tree, and they represent all of the possible findings that are relevant to proving or disproving the ultimate issue at the top of the tree. Relevance is a logical relationship between evidentiary propositions and a terminal proposition in an implication tree. 44 A particular evidentiary proposition is relevant if, but only if, a reasonable factfinder would rely upon it in determining the truth-value of a terminal proposition. 45 The problem for logical theory is modeling the probative value or weight of individual evidentiary propositions, formally combining such values into a single probative value for the totality of relevant evidence, and determining the truth-value of a terminal proposition as a function of that probative value.
Plausibility-Values of Evidentiary Propositions
While propositions in an implication tree have a three-valued truth-value, evidentiary propositions are assigned a "plausibility-value."
46 Evidentiary propositions include assertions made 44 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 45 If legal factfinding has the epistemic goal of producing knowledge, in the sense of "warranted true belief," then the notion of a proposition's being "probably true" reflects the degree to which a reasonable factfinder is warranted, on the basis of the evidence that is legally available, in believing that the proposition accurately describes its subject. See Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability, and Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 1075, 1079-97 (1996) . Usually, such a reasonable belief is only presumptively valid, and is defeasible if new evidence or a re-analysis of old evidence warrants a change in the belief. 46 See WALTON, supra note 1, at 103-50 (distinguishing plausibility from probability, and discussing the history of the concept of plausibility). For a discussion of plausibility as a useful concept for evaluating evidence and weighing hypotheses, see John R. Josephson, Plausibility, in ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE, supra note 41, at 266-72 (arguing that "coarse-scale" measures of plausibility seem to be "all we can usually get from experience" and are "almost always sufficient to decide action," while little may be gained by interpreting plausibility as mathematical probability, and it may be misleading to do so).
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by witnesses, descriptions of things entered into evidence, or other relevant descriptions (such as descriptions of a witness's demeanor). A plausibility-value is the classification on a scale of plausibility that a factfinder assigns to an evidentiary proposition. 47 note 2, at 108-17 (grading the "probative effect of an evidential fact" as "provisional credit" and "strong credit," while grading the supported conclusion as "believ[ed] … to be a fact" and "particularly strong belief"). 49 See Josephson, supra note 46, at 266-67 (stating that a "seven-step scale" using such values as "very likely" and "ruled out" was used in designing a medical diagnostic system, because "all available evidence supported the view that seven confidence grades are more than sufficient to represent physician reasoning during diagnosis"). In empirical studies of human risk perception, researchers measure the perceived risk of hazards using scales with a small number of classification categories. The decision about which plausibility scale to employ should balance non-epistemic and epistemic objectives. 51 An important non-epistemic consideration is the pragmatic context for the factfinding. 52 If the legal decision-making does not require a high level of precision in evaluating plausibility, then there may be no reason for using a scale with a large number of values. Moreover, from an epistemic standpoint, using an ordinal, qualitative scale with a small number of values often reduces the potential for classification error, especially when the concepts in the evidentiary proposition are themselves qualitative. Inconsistency in classification is good evidence of the existence of error. 53 Scientists often manage to employ very precise, quantitative plausibility scales, yet achieve acceptable consistency of results, when the subject-matter lends itself to quantitative measurements, researchers refine and test precise measurement instruments, and they train investigators to achieve reliable and valid measurements with those instruments. But ordinarylanguage concepts are often "fuzzy," or vague in their application, 54 52 See, e.g., Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 14 (stating that in abductive reasoning, besides the "judgment of likelihood" [plausibility] associated with the conclusion, the "willingness to accept the conclusion should (and typically does) depend on: … pragmatic considerations, including the costs of being wrong and the benefits of being right," as well as "how strong the need is to come to a conclusion at all"). 53 The potential for classification error can be divided into two important categories: the potential for random error (making the classifications "unreliable") and the potential for systematic error or bias (making the classifications "invalid"). plausibility scales would yield inconsistent evaluations. Moreover, ordinary legal factfinders, who are usually untrained in scientific measurement, must assign degrees of plausibility to the everyday assertions of lay witnesses. Legal rules therefore seldom require factfinders to employ any particular plausibility scale when evaluating evidence. Generally, the factfinder is free to utilize any plausibility scale, so long as the factfinder is able to apply the appropriate standard of proof in making the findings or verdicts. 55 The epistemic objective is better served, however, when the plausibility scale produces the level of precision and the potential for error that are acceptable under the circumstances. 2. Plausibility Schemas "Plausibility schemas" 57 are patterns of evidentiary propositions that use the plausibilityvalues of evidentiary propositions to assign a truth-value to the terminal proposition. 58 They are 55 The process rules about standard of proof are discussed infra text accompanying notes 132-34. 56 There is usually a cost associated with increasing precision without increasing the potential for error, or with decreasing the potential for error while retaining the same degree of precision. In a defaultreasoning context, there is always more evidence to be obtained or there are always more ways to evaluate the available evidence. Such costs must be weighed against the possible benefits involved in producing more accurate conclusions, more warranted decisions, and more justified actions. 57 The word "schema" refers to a linguistic pattern that contains variables, together with a rule for replacing linguistic elements for those variables, so that one can use the schema to generate an indefinite number of instances. In logic, schemas are used to specify sets of permissible axioms or inferences. See In semantics, schemas are used to specify conditions for assigning a truth-value to a sentence, see, e.g., SAEED, supra note 5, at 89, 305-09, or more generally, to organize cognitive domains such as language, see id. at 353-57. In the field of artificial intelligence, the concept of a schema is often generalized to the concept of a "model" or "possible world" used to define when a sentence is true, see, e.g., RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 6, at 201, but the notion of a schema also finds more particular uses, e.g., id. at 118-19 (describing schemas in genetic search algorithms), 809 (describing rules schemas in augmented grammars). 58 The same evidentiary assertion could be relevant to (attach to) many different terminal propositions. The plausibility-value of any particular evidence assertion must remain the same (be invariant), regardless of where the evidence is relevant in the tree. Plausibility reflects the evaluation of that evidence assertion relative to the support for it. By contrast, the degree of marginal support that an evidentiary assertion can provide to a terminal proposition, given the other available evidence relevant to that proposition, can vary from leaf node to leaf node. The same piece of testimony, possessing the same plausibility, can be highly probative for proving one terminal proposition, but only slightly probative for proving some other terminal proposition. Cf. WALTON, supra note 1, at 294 (stating that an "argument is evaluated on the
inference schemas that explain why the plausibility of the evidence warrants reasoning up the implication tree. 59 Like rule-based deductions, plausibility schemas have an inverted tree structure.
One set of logical connectives bridging the levels of a schema consists of generalized functions of the three truth-value connectives used in implication trees. 60 These plausibility connectives determine the plausibility-value of the conclusion on the upper level as a function of the plausibilityvalues of the evidentiary propositions on the lower level. The "AND" plausibility connective assigns to the conclusion the lowest plausibility-value possessed by any of its conjuncts. 61 The "OR" plausibility connective assigns to the conclusion the highest value of any of its disjuncts. 62 If factfinders are free to adopt different plausibility scales for different evidentiary propositions, 63 then these plausibility functions will require a rule for handling a mixture of scales -for example, where basis of (a) how plausible the premises are, and (b) how strong is the inference from the premises to the conclusion"). 59 A recent literature has developed on "argumentation schemes," WALTON, supra note 7, at 2-3, which bear a family resemblance to plausibility schemas as defined here. As Walton uses the phrase, an argumentation scheme is "presumptive and plausibilistic in nature," supporting a conclusion that is "a reasonable presumption." Id. at 13. However, "[d]rawing conclusions from premises using these argumentation schemes is a kind of presumptive guesswork" because "the basis of their support is subjective" and "attaching some numerical values, truth-values, or whatever, to the propositions is not, by itself, much help." Id. at 13-14. The function of the argumentation scheme is to orchestrate a dialogue by use of "appropriate critical questions," the asking of which shifts "a burden or weight of presumptions to the other side in a dialogue." Id. at 13-14, 46. While the study of argumentation schemes can therefore provide valuable information for developing plausibility schemas, the two structures are clearly not identical. 60 Defining the three-valued truth connectives as special cases of the many-valued plausibility connectives creates an important feature of the default-logic paradigm: the patterns of deductive reasoning within the rule-based implication tree exhibit the same connective logic as the patterns of reasoning within the generalization-based plausibility schemas. 61 Within many-valued logic, Łukasiewicz and Gödel studied this conjunction connective formally. See GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 65-66. This definition of the connective function is independent of "the number of truth degrees of the particular system of many-valued logic they belong to." Id. See WALTON, supra note 1, at 109-13 (contrasting "linked arguments," in which "the conclusion should be at least as plausible as the least plausible premise" -the "least plausible premise rule" -with "convergent arguments," for which he thinks the least plausible premise rule does not work). 62 For a formal definition of this many-valued disjunction connective, see GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 90. 63 See supra text accompanying notes 48-56. one conjunct or disjunct has a plausibility-value on a seven-point ordinal scale and another conjunct or disjunct has a quantitative value on a real-number scale. These connectives require knowing only whether a particular value on one scale is lower (for conjunction) or higher (for disjunction) than a value on another scale. Then the conclusion can be evaluated on a scale appropriate to its content, context, and support, but the scale could be as precise as the scale of the decisive evidentiary proposition -the one with the lowest plausibility-value (for conjunction) or the highest plausibilityvalue (for disjunction).
In the case of plausibility defeater, the "UNLESS" plausibility connective, if the defeater proposition is plausible, then this connective assigns to the conclusion a degree of plausibility inverse to that of the defeater proposition. 64 That is, as the plausibility of the defeater proposition increases, the plausibility of the conclusion decreases (alternatively, the implausibility of the conclusion increases). Some examples: on the five-point scale above, if the plausibility-value of the defeater is "probably true," then the plausibility-value of the conclusion is "probably false"; on the seven-point scale above, if the defeater is "highly likely," then the conclusion is "highly unlikely"; on the scale of mathematical probability, if the defeater's plausibility-vaue is 0.56, then the conclusion's plausibility-value is 0.44 (1 -0.56).
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Like truth-functional connectives, therefore, these plausibility connectives determine the conclusion's plausibility-value entirely as a function of the plausibility-values of the schema's evidentiary propositions. This is a desirable property from both a theoretical and an automation standpoint. The derivation of the inferential value is completely transparent and formal. Moreovoer, software can determine the plausibility-value of the conclusion of a plausibility schema entirely from the plausibility-values at lower levels of the schema. Section II.B infra provides several illustrations of plausibility schemas. Formally, however, a plausibility schema is an inference tree, such as the following: 66 64 Logicians have also studied a weaker kind of defeater connective that may prove useful in plausibility schemas. E.g., BREWKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 2-3, 16 (explaining a Type II defeater as "undermin[ing] the justification for a default without contradicting its conclusion; the conclusion may still hold, but we cannot use the default to justify it"); POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 79 (distinguishing "rebutting defeaters" that warrant the falsehood of the conclusion from "undercutting defeaters" that "attack the connection between the prima facie reason and its conclusion rather than attacking the conclusion itself").
From a formal standpoint, a many-valued defeater combines the functions of a many-valued conjunction ("AND") and a many-valued negation ("NOT") into a single connective ("AND-NOT"). For formal definitions of many-valued negation connectives, see GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 84-85. 65 For the calculus of mathematical probability, see supra note 50. 66 In the plausibility region of a logic diagram, the proposition shape has a dashed line around it instead of a solid line, to indicate that the proposition takes a plausibility-value instead of a truth-value. In The interpretation of such a schema is that if the evidentiary propositions on the lower level are plausible, then the conclusion is also plausible (or implausible) in the manner determined by the plausibility connective. Plausibility schemas model default reasoning to conclusions that are presumptively plausible or implausible, but defeasible.
Because plausibility schemas supply the warrant for a default inference to a presumptively true conclusion, a major strategy for designing a plausibility schema is to develop a "theory of uncertainty" for the type of inference. 67 When the available evidence is incomplete, a good theory of uncertainty can warrant drawing a presumptive but defeasible conclusion precisely because the factfinder understands what evidence is missing, why the missing evidence is relevant, but also why addition, the arrows connecting evidentiary propositions within a plausibility schema are dashed instead of solid, to indicate that the inference it represents operates plausibilistically (has "degrees of support"), instead of being the three-valued inference of an implication tree. The entire model of the complete reasoning is therefore an "inference tree," which includes both rule-based deductions and plausibility evaluations. it is nevertheless reasonable to make a finding without that missing evidence. 68 A theory of uncertainty explains how the available evidence could be plausible but the conclusion could still be false (or in the case of defeater, how the conclusion could still be true). It identifies the possible sources of error in a type of inference, and explains how that error can come about. 69 A theory of uncertainty therefore helps a factfinder to identify the sources, types, and degrees of uncertainty associated with drawing the conclusion, 70 and can suggest strategies for obtaining new evidence.
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Theories of uncertainty, incorporated into the inference structures of plausibility schemas, therefore play a critical role in default reasoning. Just as epistemic policies play a role in justifying the adoption of particular legal rules, theories of uncertainty supply the epistemic justification for adopting particular plausibility schemas as constituting warrant for default factfinding.
A common component of most (if not all) plausibility schemas is a generalization, and the presumptive force of the schema depends in large part on the plausibility of that generalization. 72 A 68 See, e.g., Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 15 (stating that when an abductive justification is challenged, a proper answer is in terms of "what is wrong with alternative explanations and what is the evidence that all plausible explanations have been considered"). 69 Theories of uncertainty often consider three broad sources of error: linguistic, logical, and causal. Walker, supra note 67, at 1532-38. Error might arise because the factfinder misunderstands the meanings of the words used (the linguistic dimension), the logical relationships among the propositions asserted (the logical dimension), or the causal relationships among the objects or events involved (the causal dimension). 70 Id. at 1525-26, 1538-43. 71 Id. at 1526. 72 For general discussions of the role of generalizations within legal reasoning, see ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at 63-69, 367-79; SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-83, 101-02, 109-12, 209-10, 261-69, 472; WALTON, supra note 7, at 46, 51-53, 151-54. Some logical theorists have treated generalizations, as defined here, as being a species of propositions that they call "warrants." See, e.g., STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 97-107 (1958) (giving the example of a possible warrant as "A Swede can be taken almost certainly not to be a Roman Catholic"); TOULMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 45-59, 219-29 (discussing generalizations based on samples or signs and causal generalizations as kinds of backing for warrants).
The logical structure of warrant for a direct inference is distinct from the cognitive process of producing possible generalizations on which to base a direct inference. For one analysis of the latter process, see, e.g., JEROME P. KASSIRER & RICHARD I. KOPELMAN, LEARNING CLINICAL REASONING 2-46 (1991) (analyzing the process of generating, refining, and verifying medical hypotheses for diagnosing diseases of specific patients in a clinical setting). generalization usually asserts that a description is true in some situations but not all situations.
73
When a generalization is analyzed into its logical predicate and one or more indefinite subjects, 74 it asserts that the predicate accurately describes some portion of the subject class. 75 Examples of generalizations are: "most witnesses testifying under oath tell the truth," "one-third of Americans are overweight," and "60% of the test group in the study developed the disease." These generalizations have the following logical forms (respectively): "most As are Bs," "X/Y of As are Bs," and "X% of the members of group A are (also) members of group B." In these propositions, logicians call group A the "reference class" or "reference group" for the generalization. 76 The content of a generalization includes an asserted degree of "quantification" over the reference class - 73 Logicians often call propositions asserted to be true about all members of a group "generalizations," e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 431-32, but less-than-universal generalizations are far more common in assessing plausibility of evidence. 74 Logical subjects are divided into definite and indefinite subjects. See, e.g., RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 114-20 (discussing "singular terms" and "general terms"); LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, at 286-301, 319-59 (discussing the "definiteness effect" and "definite descriptions" within semantic theory); CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 55-68, 105-08 (discussing, within semantic theory, the concepts of proper names and definite descriptions, as contrasted with general terms and common nouns). Definite subjects are specific individuals that are denoted by proper names ("John Jones") or by definite descriptions ("the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2006-234"), or by pronouns taking their denotations from proper names or definite descriptions. Indefinite subjects are individuals that are identified entirely by their general characteristics. Indefinite subjects can be denoted by common nouns ("plaintiffs"), indefinite descriptions ("a party to a lawsuit"), and other grammatical phrases that name groups or classes of individuals. In ordinary language, the same phrase might be used to name either a definite subject or an indefinite subject (e.g., "a justice of the United States Supreme Court"), depending upon whether the speaker intends to name a specific individual or merely an indefinite member of a class or group. 75 This concept of "generalization" is that employed by logicians. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 431-32; CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 113-17; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 119-20. This concept is very close to that employed by Wigmore, Anderson, and Twining, see ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at 43-44, 63-69, 367-84 (giving numerous examples of generalizations), and at least consistent with the hypothetical concept of generalization employed by Toulmin and Schum, see TOULMIN, supra note 72, at 98 (calling "general, hypothetical statements" that authorize inferences "warrants"); SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-82 (calling generalizations "assertions about what happens in general," intended to state "why we believe we are entitled to reason from one stage to another"). The more formal concept of generalization employed by logicians and in the defaultlogic paradigm is more conducive to capture in artificial intelligence software. that is, the size of the portion of A that is asserted to be B. 77 Moreover, a generalization often contains an explicit modal "hedge" qualifying the entire assertion, which can influence the plausibility-value compared to an unhedged generalization. 78 Examples of modal hedges are expressions of frequency (e.g., "sometimes" or "often"), typicality (e.g., "typically" or "normally"), temporal limitation (e.g., "in the past" or "at least for the immediate future"), or degree of confidence of the speaker (e.g., "perhaps" or "almost certainly"). 79 The degree of quantification asserted and the modal hedge employed change the content of the generalization, and therefore can influence its plausibility. As Part II.B of this article illustrates, these attributes of generalizations can influence in turn the degree of warrant that a plausibility schema provides for a conclusion.
Findings of Fact
The purpose of using a plausibility schema is to warrant a finding that a terminal proposition is either true or false. The function of a schema is to organize the relevant evidence in such a way that the presumptive nature of the reasoning becomes transparent. Primary factors in selecting a schema to use for a particular terminal proposition are therefore the logical form of the terminal proposition and the nature of the available evidence. For example, whether the terminal proposition is a generalization about groups or a proposition about a specific individual will determine what kind of schema is needed. And evidence that is scientific and statistical should be organized differently than eyewitness testimony. While this article cannot present a complete catalog of possible plausibility schemas, or explore their properties in a formal way, it does provide an extended illustration focusing on one type of important terminal proposition (in Section II.B infra). 77 Traditional predicate logic has studied extensively the formal properties of two important quantifiers: the universal quantifier ("all As …") and the existential quantifier ("some As …" or "at least one A …"). E.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 431-59; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 124-34; SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 141-47, 182-90. 78 See SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-83, 101-02, 110-12 (giving as examples of "hedges" the adverbs "sometimes," "frequently," "often," and "usually"); TOULMIN, supra note 72, at 100-01, 108-13 (discussing "modal qualifiers," such as "presumably" and "almost certainly," as "indicating the strength conferred by the warrant" on an inference from evidence to conclusion). It is not always clear in legal writings, however, whether the hedge term is about frequency (how often the asserted description is true), fuzzy set membership (how definitively individuals can be placed in a class or given a description), degree of warrant (how good the evidential support is), or subjective confidence (how convinced the speaker is). See Walker, supra note 67, at 1560-62. 79 See Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 22-23; SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-82; TOULMIN, supra note 72, at 100-02 (discussing "modal qualifiers" like "presumably" as expressing a "degree of force"). Plausibility schemas are not implication trees, and attaching schematized evidence to an implication tree does not extend that tree. First, as noted above, the evidentiary propositions within a plausibility schema have plausibility-values on variable scales of plausibility, not truth-values on a three-valued scale. Moreover, the factfinder selects schemas and plausibility scales to fit the evidence in the particular case, whereas authoritative institutions adopt the legal rules modeled by the implication tree. This means that the schematized evidence is specific to the particular case and factfinder, whereas the implication tree is generic to all cases within the legal jurisdiction. There are many plausibility schemas that might warrant a particular terminal proposition, depending upon the nature and probative value of the available evidence. The fact that one line of evidentiary reasoning provides sufficient warrant in a particular case does not mean that no other line of reasoning could warrant that finding as well, or that no other reasoning would provide stronger warrant. An entire "inference tree," composed of an implication tree at the top and schemas of evidence attached to terminal propositions toward the bottom, models the entire legal reasoning in the particular casewhich includes rules, policies, findings, and evidentiary bases for those findings.
In order for plausibility schemas to provide a transparent and principled inference from plausible evidence to a finding, there must be a rule for determining the truth-value of a terminal proposition as a function of the plausibility-value of the evidence relevant to that proposition. In legal terminology, this rule is the applicable "standard of proof." 80 For example, the standard of proof for most issues of fact in civil cases is preponderance of the evidence. 81 Under this rule, if the factfinder evaluates the relevant evidence as having any plausibility-value other than "undecided," then the factfinder must assign the corresponding truth-value to the terminal proposition -that is, find the terminal proposition to be true if she evaluates the evidence as plausible to any degree, and find the terminal proposition to be false if she evaluates the evidence as being implausible to any degree. The use of the preponderance standard of proof in law has a number of policy-based rationales. 82 Part III.B of this article discusses standards of proof generally, as a type of process rule, but such standards are essential to warranting inferences from evidence that is merely plausible to 80 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, § § 7.5, 7.14 (discussing "the three generally recognized standards of proof … : preponderance, clear and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt"). 81 82 Walker, supra note 45, at 1083-92, 1113-20 (discussing, besides the epistemic objective, three policy rationales for the preponderance standard of proof: creating an incentive for all parties to produce an adequate amount of relevant evidence; treating all parties to a proceeding in an unbiased and nearly equal manner, despite the fact that one party bears the burden of persuasion; and producing findings that are likely to enjoy a fairly wide scope of agreement, at least among reasonable people weighing the same evidence).
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rule-based deductions and ultimate conclusions. Standards of proof are the warrant links between the output of plausibility schemas and the input to the implication trees to which the schemas attach.
B. Examples of Plausibility Schemas
This section illustrates the use of default logic to evaluate evidence, by briefly considering three plausibility schemas: the direct-inference schema, the statistical-generalization schema, and the personal-observation schema. These three schemas can model one type of warrant for a finding about an unobserved property of a definite subject or specific individual. Examples of such findings are: "the tire that caused the accident had a manufacturing or design defect," 83 The definite subject S is in category A.
Therefore, the definite subject S is probably (also) in category B.
A direct-inference schema consists of two premises leading to a conclusion. The first or major premise is a generalization that asserts that some portion of things in category A are in fact also in category B. 93 The second or minor premise is an assertion that a specific individual or definite subject (S) is in category A. 94 A logic diagram of this direct-inference syllogism is as follows:
patients"); DAN MAYER, ESSENTIAL EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE 9-15 (2004) (discussing six steps in the process of EBM). 90 It is an underlying principle of the default-logic paradigm that empirical research together with logical analysis might uncover many patterns of sound presumptive reasoning. Theories of uncertainty could then be the bases for converting them into plausibility schema. This optimism runs counter to the pessimism of some theorists, e.g., SCHUM, supra note 25, at 472 (concluding that " [t] here is no general standard according to which we may grade the plausibility of generalizations that we may assert," and that "there are no rules showing us which generalizations to invoke as we attempt to link evidence to hypotheses"). One type of direct inference is sometimes called "abduction," when abduction is defined as "inference to the best explanation," or as "a process of reasoning from effect to cause" to explain the data in a specific case. Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 5, 7, 17. However, some authors explicitly exclude direct inference from the definition of abduction. See id. at 23-24. 92 See Walker, supra note 51, at 386-89 (discussing direct inference in warranting conclusions about specific causation in tort cases). 93 When the portion of A asserted to be B is identified statistically (using for example a mathematical proportion or percentage), then logicians often call the generalization a "statistical generalization," and the direct-inference pattern a "statistical syllogism. While direct-inference reasoning has intuitive appeal, the uncertainties inherent in such reasoning become clearer by examining each of the two premises. The first or major premise is a generalization asserting that some portion of the members of reference class A are also in category B. 96 The plausibility of this premise rests in turn upon a plausibility schema for warranting generalizations. One possible type of evidence is statistical data, and a theory of uncertainty would explain the potential for error in generalizing from such data. One plausibility schema for warranting statistical generalizations incorporates two types or sources of uncertainty: measurement uncertainty and sampling uncertainty. Each type of uncertainty can increase or decrease the inference is called a "statistical syllogism" because a statistical premise (such as "X percent of As are B") is used instead of a universal generalization ("All As are B"). SALMON, supra, at 88-91; POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 75-77. For early recognition of the difficulty such inferences pose for legal theory, see George F. James, Relevancy, Probability, and the Law, 29 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 689 (1941). 94 Ayer defined a distinct class of judgments that he called "judgements of credibility." A. J. AYER, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE 27-29, 53-61 (1972). As he said: "the judgement that such and such an individual smoker will probably die of lung cancer, if it is genuinely a judgement about this individual, and not just about the class of smokers to which he belongs, is a judgement of credibility." Id. at 28. 95 For a direct-inference analysis of reasoning to a warranted finding about causation of a specific plaintiff's injury in a tort case, see Walker, supra note 51, at 452-60. 96 For a general discussion of reasoning involving the backing for generalizations, see TOULMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 219-29. 98 For discussion and references on measurement or classification uncertainty, see Walker, supra note 51, at 389-95. 99 The degree of precision asserted in the generalization can also affect its plausibility. A generalization asserting that a precise percentage of As are Bs may require stronger support than a generalization asserting merely that "most" As are Bs. 100 Measurement uncertainty rests in turn on reliability and validity, each of which can reduce the plausibility of the generalization. See supra note 53. Reliability describes the degree of variability in outcome when reclassifying the same subject using the same measurement process. Validity characterizes the inaccuracy resulting from a measurement process when the results are compared to the results from another measurement process for the same property or characteristic. Researchers can improve reliability and validity by different methods -by improving the measurement instruments or measurement process, or by improving the analysis of the data. See Walker, supra note 51, at 394-95. Moreover, as discussed above in the context of classifying evidentiary assertions, supra text accompanying notes 51-56, the degrees of unreliability and invalidity that are acceptable in a particular situation depend upon the pragmatic purpose for which the inference is being made. Walker, supra note 51, at 395. Acceptable Within the second branch, the plausibility of the statistical generalization depends upon whether the sampling uncertainty is acceptable. 101 The sample is the collection of individuals that were actually measured in order to obtain the empirical data. Sampling uncertainty is the potential for error introduced precisely because the reasoning proceeds from statistics about a sample of measured individuals to a conclusion about a more general population. Whether sampling uncertainty is acceptable depends upon how representative (with respect to the association of A with B) that sample is relative to the population described in the generalization. The plausibility of the statistical generalization depends not only on the uncertainty inherent in the measurement processes, but also on the uncertainty created by measuring the members of one sample as opposed to another.
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The minor premise of the direct-inference syllogism identifies a definite subject S and classifies that specific individual as being a member of group A. One possible type of evidence for such a conclusion is the report of an eyewitness based upon her own perceptual observation. 103 A complete plausibility schema for observational reports based upon personal perception (a "personalobservation schema") is likely to be very complicated, but some theorists have explored the reasoning that forms the upper levels of that schema. 104 According to a theory of uncertainty based reliability and validity in the measurements of A and B are therefore necessary conditions for finding a statistical generalization to be plausible.
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on the analysis by Schum, the plausibility of the eyewitness report depends on three conditions: the observational capability of the eyewitness, the witness's memory about what she perceived, and the witness's veracity in accurately reporting what she remembers. 105 Taken together, these three branches constitute the credibility of the witness herself in asserting that she observed the subject S as being an A. 106 Additional conditions for the plausibility of the witness's assertion that S is an A are whether this assertion is consistent with the meaning of "being an A" (e.g., S must possess the properties entailed by being an A), and whether the assertion is plausible in light of what else is known about S (and about things like S). 107 A plausibility schema for an eyewitness report about a definite subject, therefore, would have a tree-like structure possessing these conditions in some combination, and each branch could lead to further analysis.
The plausibility of the major and minor premises considered individually, however, does not exhaust the potential for error in a direct inference. The generalization (the major premise) could be plausible, as well as the categorization of S as an A (the minor premise), but the fit between these premises and the conclusion can still cause uncertainty about the inference. One possible fallacy is relying on the proportion B/A to make an inference about a specific individual S when there no warrant for doing so. For example, 52% of U.S. citizens might be female, and a certain person S might be a U.S. citizen, but finding on this basis alone a 0.52 probability that S is female would be unwarranted without more information about S. The finding could be warranted by the additional information that S has been randomly selected from the set of U.S. citizens. This reasoning is familiar from predictions about lottery drawings. In a lottery drawing, the probability of drawing a particular type of object (such as a numbered ball) is equal to the proportion of such objects in the lottery pool, provided each object in the pool has an equal chance of being selected on the next draw.
108 Similarly in a direct inference, if there is warrant that the definite subject S is a randomly drawn member of A with respect to being B, then the probability that S is a B will equal the ratio conclude by direct inference that "the probability = B/A that definite subject S is (also) in category B."
The plausibility of the direct inference is also a function of the fit between the degree of quantification in the generalization and the probability asserted within the conclusion. 110 The size of the ratio B/A asserted in the generalization (major premise) certainly limits the range of probabilities that can plausibly be asserted in a conclusion. 111 For example, if only "a few" As are Bs, then this evidence alone cannot warrant a conclusion stating that "probably" S is a B. On the other hand, if "most" As are Bs, then this evidence would warrant a conclusion that "probably" S is a B, provided S is a random member of A with respect to B. Other things being equal, if the definite subject S is a random member of A with respect to B, then as the proportion B/A increases, the probability within a plausible conclusion can also increase; and as the proportion B/A decreases, the plausible probability within the conclusion decreases.
The revised plausibility schema for direct inference therefore includes the major and minor premise of the direct-inference syllogism, together with the two conditions just discussed:
The text above has discussed each branch in turn, in enough detail to suggest additional schemas that could prove plausibility for each branch. The plausibility connective "AND" conjoining the branches makes the plausibility-value of the conclusion, insofar as it is warranted by a direct inference, equal to the plausibility-value of the least plausible of these four conjuncts.
The direct-inference schema also illustrates how plausibility schemas can integrate scientific or other expert evidence with lay, non-expert evidence. Expert knowledge domains supply evidence for legal decision-making, often in the form of generalizations, and those generalizations become evidentiary assertions within plausibility schemas. But those generalizations alone, no matter how well established, cannot warrant a conclusion about a specific individual S. Doubts about S's being in category A or how S was selected from category A may seriously undermine the probative value of the generalization in the particular case.
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This brief discussion of direct inference illustrates a number of logical features of plausibility schemas. First, the appropriate schema to use in evaluating the plausibility of evidence depends upon the logical nature of the conclusion being drawn and upon the type of evidence offered to warrant that conclusion. The logical nature of the conclusion is determined by the terminal proposition to which the evidence attaches. The evidence, however, might be eyewitness testimony, or a direct inference based on a scientific generalization, or some other type of plausible Evidentiary Process Rules
Within the default-logic paradigm, evidentiary process rules include much more than the traditional law of evidence. Evidentiary process rules structure the decision-making process involved in evaluating evidence and making findings or rulings on terminal propositions. This includes rules about relevancy (attaching evidentiary assertions to terminal propositions) 130 ; rules about admissibility (either excluding some proffered evidence from the case altogether, or prohibiting the attachment of particular items of admitted evidence to certain terminal propositions) 131 ; rules about sufficiency of evidence (deciding whether the totality of evidence attached to a terminal proposition can reasonably warrant a finding that the proposition is true) 132 ;
standards of proof (establishing the threshold degree of plausibility required to assign a truth-value to a terminal proposition) 133 ; and rules allocating the burden of persuasion (determining what finding to make when the totality of attached evidence evaluates precisely on the threshold degree of plausibility established by the standard of proof). 134 All of these rules constrain the factfinder's discretion in evaluating the evidence and making findings, by allowing the presiding legal authority to oversee the factfinding process. From a logical perspective, evidentiary process rules supply implication trees for deciding issues raised by various kinds of motions.
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